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efforts directed at the former party's attorney would transfer the
burden to counsel alone either to comply and breach a confidence
or not comply and personally face a contempt order.0'1 It is suggested that it is unlikely that the statute contemplated such a result.
It is submitted that the Jacqueline F. majority neither derogated the principles upon which the attorney-client privilege is
based nor diluted the strength of the privilege itself. Nevertheless,
in the absence of potential harm to a child's welfare, it is suggested
that the privilege should not be disregarded even where nondisclosure of the client's address may serve to evade a court order. Conceivably, resort to available enforcement procedures in that instance may be sufficient to compel disclosure.Z
Annette L. Guarino

GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW

GML § 50-e: Time period for claimant to apply for permission to
serve late notice of claim not tolled by infancy under CPLR 208
Where a notice of claim is required by statute'03 as a condition
devices available in article 52 of the CPLR for the enforcement of money judgments. See, e.g.,
CPLR 5222, 5251 (1978).
"I See CPLR 5104 (1978); SIEGEL §§ 482-483, at 644-46. With respect to the enforcement
of child custody decrees, the contempt remedy is available to "uphold judicial process and
the reasonable expectations of those who turn to it." Id. § 481, at 645; see People ex rel.
Feldman v. Warden, 46 App. Div. 2d 256, 362 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't 1974), aff'd mem., 36
N.Y.2d 846, 331 N.E.2d 631, 370 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1975) (foster mother who willfully refused to
produce child in custody proceeding, with ability to do so, incarcerated for contempt until
performance of act); SIEGEL, at 644 n.24.
20 See notes 196, 200 & 201 supra.
The primary purpose of modern notice of claim statutes is to permit prompt and
efficient investigation of claims against municipalities. See, e.g., Beary v. City of Rye, 44
N.Y.2d 398, 412-13, 377 N.E.2d 453, 458, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9, 13-14 (1978); Adkins v. City of New
York, 43 N.Y.2d 346, 350, 372 N.E.2d 311, 312, 401 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (1977); Board of Educ.
v. Heckler Elec. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 476, 483, 166 N.E.2d 666, 669, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1960).
Although the scope of section 50-e is limited to tort suits, contract actions against municipalities may also entail the mandatory service of a timely notice of claim. See, e.g., Flanagan v.
Board of Educ., 63 App. Div. 2d 1013, 406 N.Y.S.2d 503 (2d Dep't 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 47 N.Y.2d 613, 393 N.E.2d 991, 419 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1979); Shulga v. Lewin, 415
N.Y.S.2d 765 (Civ. Ct. Kings County 1979); CPLR 9802; N.Y. Enuc. LAW § 3813(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. LocAL FIN. LAW § 85.10 (McKinney Pam. 1971-1979);
N.Y. ToWN LAW § 65(3) (McKinney 1965); NEW YoRK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 16, § 394a-1.0
(1976). If there is no express statutory provision, service of a notice of claim is not a pre-
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precedent" 4 to the commencement of a tort action against a public
corporation, section 50-e of the General Municipal Law mandates
that the notice be served within 90 days from the time the cause of
action accrues.2 05 Prior to the amendment of subdivision 5 of section
50-e in 1976, courts had discretion to grant leave to serve a late
notice only when the application was made within 1 year of the
accrual of the plaintiff's claim, the 1-year period not subject to
tolling by reason of a claimant's infancy.0 ' As amended, the subdirequisite to the maintenance of an action. See Meed v. Nassau County Police Dep't, 70 Misc.
2d 274, 332 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
The constitutionality of notice of claim statutes in general, and as applied to infants,
has been repeatedly upheld. See Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866
(1952); MacMullen v. City of Middletown, 187 N.Y. 37, 79 N.E. 863 (1907); Paulsey v.
Chaloner, 54 App. Div. 2d 131, 388 N.Y.S.2d 35 (3d Dep't 1976), appeal dismissed mem., 41
N.Y.2d 900, 362 N.E.2d 641, 393 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1977); Guarrera v. A.L. Lee Memorial Hosp.,
51 App. Div. 2d 867, 380 N.Y.S.2d 161 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 39 N.Y.2d 942, 386
N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1976).
2" A condition precedent is an act or event, other than a lapse of time, which must exist
or occur before a duty of immediate performance of a promise arises. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 250 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 250(a) (1932).
As applied to tort claims under § 50-e of the General Municipal Law, service of a timely notice
of claim is required before the municipal entity "performs its promise" to allow suits against
itself. See Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 485, 104 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1952). Ordinarily, a failure to perform a condition precedent may be excused. S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
676 (3d ed. 1961); see Winter v. City of Niagara Falls, 190 N.Y. 198, 204, 82 N.E. 1101, 1102
(1907). Types of excuses include impossibility, waiver, and estoppel. S. WILLISTON, supra. In
Winter, the Court doubted that the requirement of serving a notice of claim could be waived
by the authorities. 190 N.Y. at 204, 82 N.E. at 1103. Recently, however, the Court of Appeals
held that a defendant may be estopped from asserting a defense of untimely service of a notice
of claim where a claimant changes his position to his detriment in justifiable reliance on the
actions of a governmental subdivision. Bender v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38
N.Y.2d 662, 668, 345 N.E.2d 561, 564, 382 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20-21 (1976), rev'g 46 App. Div. 2d
898, 361 N.Y.S.2d 939 (2d Dep't 1974), and modifying Economou v. New York City Health
& Hosps. Corp., 47 App. Div. 2d 877, 366 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1st Dep't 1975); see Scibilia v. City
of Niagara Falls, 44 App. Div. 2d 757, 757, 354 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (4th Dep't 1974); Johnson
v. Board of Educ., 33 App. Div. 2d 647, 647, 305 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90-91 (4th Dep't 1969).
Section 50-e(1)(a) of the General Municipal Law provides in pertinent part:
In any case founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required by law as a
condition precedent to the commencement of an action. . . against a public corporation . . . the notice of claim shall comply with and be served in accordance with
the provisions of this section within ninety days after the claim arises.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e(1)(a) (McKinney 1977).
Section 50-e itself does not require service of a notice of claim as a condition precedent
to maintaining a tort action against a public corporation. Preliminary notices of claim are
mandated by numerous general, special and local laws scattered throughout the state. For a
partial compilation of such laws, see Graziano, Recommendations Relating to Section 50-e
of the General Municipal Law and Related Statutes, TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun.
CONFERENCE, 358, 420-27 (1976). Section 50-e was enacted to provide uniform time and procedural requirements for these statutes. Martin v. School Board, 301 N.Y. 233, 235, 93 N.E.2d
655, 655 (1950).
m'The requirement under the prior law that leave to serve a late notice of claim could
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vision designates the "time limited for the commencement of an
action" as the outer limit within which a claimant may apply for
leave to serve a late notice of claim."' Courts interpreting the new
not be obtained after 1 year expired from the date the claim accrued was rigid and inflexible.
See Graziano, supra note 205, at 384. Courts had no power to extend the time beyond the
statutory limit even in the most egregious circumstances. E.g., Moore v. City of New York,
302 N.Y. 563, 96 N.E.2d 619 (1951) (insanity); Corso v. City of New York, 42 Misc. 2d 677,
248 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1964) (amnesia). Leave to service late notice
within the statutory period could be granted only where the claimant died during the 90-day
period, was unable to take timely legal action by reason of infancy or physical or mental
incapacitation, or delayed in serving notice' because he reasonably relied on the written
settlement representations of the defendant or his insurance carrier. Ch. 694, § 1, [1945]
N.Y. Laws 1486-87, as amended by ch. 814, § 1, [1959] N.Y. Laws 2131. A claimant under
infancy or suffering from mental or physical incapacity had to establish that failure to serve
a notice of claim while the 90-day period required by section 50-e(1) was attributable to the
disability. Id. This caused great hardship to infant claimants who could not establish an
actual causal connection between late filing and infancy. See, e.g., Santiago v. Board of Educ.
of New York, 41 App. Div. 2d 616, 340 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1st Dep't 1973); Ostrander v. City of
Syracuse, 40 App. Div. 2d 622, 336 N.Y.S.2d 558 (4th Dep't 1972), affd mem., 33 N.Y.2d
960, 309 N.E.2d 132, 353 N.Y.S. 2d 732 (1974); Anderson v. County of Nassau, 31 App. Div.
2d 761, 297 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dep't 1969).
Courts attempted to ease the strictness of showing a causal relationship by indulging in
a presumption of an impediment due to infancy, without requiring it to be factually proven.
See Sherman v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 36 N.Y.2d 776, 329 N.E.2d 673, 368 N.Y.S.2d
842 (1975); Murray v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 113, 282 N.E.2d 103, 331 N.Y.S.2d 9
(1972); Potter v. Board of Educ., 43 App. Div. 2d 248, 350 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st Dep't 1974).
But see Sherman v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 36 N.Y.2d 776, 777-78, 329 N.E.2d 673, 674,
368 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843-44 (1975) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
Although the pre-amendment version of § 50-e and its predecessor local-notice-of-claim
statutes explicitly stated that a court could not entertain an application for leave to serve a
notice of claim after the statutory period expired, see, e.g., Ch. 466, § 149, [1901] N.Y. Laws
1184, as amended by, ch. 452, § 261, [1912] N.Y. Laws 934-35, an exception was often made
in the case of an "immature infant," Russo v. City of New York, 258 N.Y. 344, 348, 179 N.E.
762, 763 (1932); Murphy v. Village of Fort Edward, 213 N.Y. 397, 403, 107 N.E. 716, 717
(1915); Hector v. City of New York, 193 Misc. 727, 728-29, 85 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442-43 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1948). As a matter of law, an "immature infant" was a minor under the age of
10, Russo v. City of New York, 258 N.Y. 344, 348, 179 N.E. 762, 763 (1932), although a 14
year-old could have been an immature infant, id. This exception was put to rest, however, in
Martin v. School Bd., 301 N.Y. 233, 93 N.E.2d 655 (1950), wherein the Court of Appeals held
that a court had no authority to extend the time to apply for leave to serve a late notice
beyond the statutory period even in the case of an infant, id. at 238-39, 93 N.E.2d at 657; see
note 218 infra. The harshness of the Martin rule became apparent in subsequent decisions.
In Camarella v. East Irondequoit Cent. School Bd., 34 N.Y.2d 139, 313 N.E.2d 29, 356
N.Y.S.2d 553 (1974), for example, an infant's action had proceeded to the point of a jury
verdict in his favor when the defendant raised the issue of the infant's untimely notice of
claim on appeal for the first time. Since the statutory period for late service had long since
expired, the Court had no power to grant an extension. Id. at 142, 373 N.E.2d at 30, 356
N.Y.S.2d at 354. The Court then commented on the need for legislative reconsideration of §
50-e. Id. at 142-43, 313 N.E.2d at 30, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
Ch. 745, § 2, [1976] N.Y. Laws 1525 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw
§ 50-e(5) (McKinney 1977)). The 1976 amendment removed the requirement that a claimant's disability have a causal connection to the failure to serve a timely notice. Id.; see
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provision have suggested in dicta that the tolling provisions of
CPLR 20801 apply to cases involving applications by infants to serve
late notices of claim.2 9 Recently, however, the Appellate Division,
Second Department, in Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free School
210
District,
held that the infancy provision of CPLR 208 does not toll
the period of time within which a court may grant leave to serve a
2
late notice of claim. '
In Cohen, the infant claimant was injured while participating
in a school soccer game, and approximately 2 years later, he moved
for permission to serve a late notice on the school district.2 12 Originally, the Supreme Court, Rockland County, denied the motion
because it had not been brought within 1 year and 90 days after the
' '2 3
accident, "the time limited for the commencement of the action. 1
FOURTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON TlE

REP.

OF THE

CPLR (1976), in TWENTY-FIRsT

ANN.

N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 282, 301 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 REPORT], and

eliminated the requirement that settlement representations of a defendant be in writing, N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAw § 50-e(5) (McKinney 1977); see 1976 REPORT, supra, at 302. Additional factors
under the amended provision for the courts to consider in deciding the question of granting
leave to serve a late notice are whether a claimant's excusable error concerned the identity
of the public corporation to be sued, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 50-e(5) (McKinney 1977); see
Bender v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 662, 345 N.E.2d 561, 382
N.Y.S.2d 18 (1974); 1976 REPORT, supra, at 302, whether the public corporation acquired
actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within the 90-day period of § 50-e(1),
and whether permitting late service will substantially prejudice the corporation's defense on
the merits, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 50-e(5) (McKinney 1977). See 1976 REPORT, supra, at 30103.
2a CPLR 208 provides in pertinent part:
If a person entitled to commence an action is under a disabiity because of
infancy or insanity at the time the cause of action accrues, and. . . if the time...
is less than three years, the time shall be extended by the period of the disability.
CPLR 208 (Supp. 1979-1980). Where service of a notice of claim by an infant or disabled
person under § 50-e(1)(a) is timely, courts have held that the time limitation under § 50-i
for the commencement of the action is tolled by CPLR 208. Hurd v. County of Allegany, 39
App. Div. 2d 499, 502, 336 N.Y.S.2d 952, 956 (4th Dep't 1972); Corbett v. FayettevilleManlius Cent. School Dist., 34 App. Div. 2d 379, 380-81, 311 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (4th Dep't
1970); Abbatemarco v. Town of Brookhaven, 26 App. Div. 2d 664, 664, 272 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451
(2d Dep't 1966); LaFave v. Town of Franklin, 20 App. Div. 2d 738, 738, 247 N.Y.S.2d 72, 7374 (3d Dep't 1964).
1 Beary v. City of Rye, 44 N.Y.2d 398, 413, 377 N.E.2d 453, 458-59, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9, 14
(1978); Vega v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 65 App. Div. 2d 713, 713, 410 N.Y.S.2d
594, 595 (1st Dep't 1978); McGill v. Board of Educ., 59 App. Div. 2d 888, 888, 399 N.Y.S.2d
41, 42 (2d Dep't 1977), appeal dismissed, 43 N.Y.2d 893, 374 N.E.2d 396, 403 N.Y.S.2d 499
(1978); see note 230 infra.
21 70 App. Div. 2d 94, 419 N.Y.S.2d 998 (2d Dep't 1979).
2 Id. at 98, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
122 Id. at 95-96, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 999. The claimant's motion was made approximately 15
months after the effective date of the amendment to section 50-e and approximately 26
months after the accident. Id. at 96, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
213Id. at 97, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
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Upon reargument, special term apparently interpreted an intervening Court of Appeals decision, Beary v. City of Rye, 2 1 as indicating
that the time within which an infant may serve a notice of claim
tolls during the period of his infancy. Thus, special term, citing
CPLR 208, found the application timely, since it was made within
1 year and 90 days from the date the infant reached his majority.25
2 6
Referring to special term's reliance on Beary as "misplaced,
the appellate division reversed. In a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Titone, the court reasoned that Beary did not resolve the
question presented, since the only issue in Beary was whether the
217
1976 amendment to section 50-e should be retroactively applied.
Justice Titone declared that the legislative history and judicial decisions addressing the pre-1976 version of section 50-e clearly indicated that infancy did not toll the limitation period for applying for
leave to serve a late notice of claim.2 11 The Cohen court found that
in amending the section, the legislature did not contemplate a
change by tolling or extending the time within which an application
for late service could be considered. 2 9 Rather, Justice Titone viewed
the amendment as a limited change intended to enlarge the class
of people eligible to apply for leave to serve a late notice22 ° and found
no language, express or implied, that tolled the period for late service in the case of an infant claimant.2 2 ' The court concluded that if
214 44

N.Y.2d 398, 377 N.E.2d 453, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1978), discussed in The Survey, 53

ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 107, 153 (1978).
225 70 App. Div. 2d at 97-98, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (2d Dep't 1979).
226 Id. at 98, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
217Id.
221 Id.

at 101-05, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1003-05. The court observed that in enacting § 50-e in

1945, ch. 694, § 1, [1945] N.Y. Laws 1486, the legislature specifically rejected a recommendation by the Judicial Council that would have extended the time for late service in the case of
a person under a disability until a reasonable time after its removal. 70 App. Div. 2d at 10001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1002-03. See Recommended Improvements and Unification of Requirements of Notice of Claim against Municipal Corporations, TENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun.
COUNCIL

(1944) 265, 266.

The Cohen court also discussed the conflict in the trial courts with respect to the tenderyears exception which was resolved in Martin v. School Bd., 301 N.Y. 233, 193 N.E.2d 655
(1950). See 70 App. Div. 2d at 101-04, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1003-04; note 206 supra.
Additionally, Justice Titone observed that notice statutes are intended to allow municipal or public corporations the opportunity to make a prompt investigation of the incident,
whereas statutes of limitations are intended to bury stale claims. 70 App. Div. 2d at 99, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02. Since the purpose of a tolling statute based on a disability is to give
such person additional time to sue, the court concluded that "exceptions to a limitations
statute in favor of persons under a disability should be strictly construed and never extended
beyond their plain import." Id. at 99-100, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
219 70 App. Div. 2d at 105, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
22 Id.; see note 207 supra.
2' 70 App. Div. 2d at 105, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
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the legislature had intended a tolling provision, it could have enacted implementing language in CPLR 208 when it amended section
50-e.12
In reaching its decision, it is submitted that the Cohen court
misinterpreted the legislative intent underlying the 1976 amendment to section 50-e as expressed in the 1976 Judicial Conference
report to the legislature. 22 The report states that "[t]he shortness
of the statutory period, which even against persons under a disability runs from the happening of the event, rather than the removal
of the disability . . . ha[s] produced grossly unjust results, and
urgently require[s] statutory relief. ' ' 224 Immediately thereafter in
the text of the report is set forth the amendment changing the
period in which a court may allow a claimant to serve a late notice
from within 1 year of the claim's accrual to the "time limited for
the commencement of an action by the claimant against the public
corporation." ' In discussing this extension, the report comments
that no attempt is made to extend the statute of limitations for the
commencement of the action,22 but the statute of limitations is
tolled when the claimant is under a disability.2 2 7 Since the statute
of limitations is identical to the new statutory limit within which a
late notice of claim may be served, this comment clearly indicates
that the legislature intended to extend the discretionary period for
serving a late notice of claim by the period of the applicable statute
of limitations as tolled by CPLR 208.221
2m Id.
" 1976 REPORT, supra note 207, at 286-307.
" Id. at 286.

Id. at 291.
21 Id. at 303. The report comments that there is a "hands off" policy regarding any

attempt to "extend the short statutes of limitation which normally govern . . . actions
against a public corporation." Id. Under the General Municipal Law, the time period within

which a claimant may commence an action against a municipal corporation is limited to 1
year and 90 days. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 50-i (McKinney 1970). This provision was enacted

in 1959 on the recommendation of the Joint Legislative Committee on Municipal Tort Liability. Its purpose was to alleviate existing confusion with respect to variations in the statutes
of limitations. Ch. 788, § 1, [1959] N.Y. Laws 2082.
2 1976 REPORT, supra note 207, at 303. See note 206 and accompanying text supra.
221See H. PETERFREUND & J. McLAUGHLIN, NEW YORK PRACTICE 196-97 (4th ed. 1978);

1978 Survey of New York Law: Civil Practice, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 385, 393-95 (1979); 1976
Survey of New York Law: Civil Practice, 28 SYRAcusE L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1977).
Before the Judicial Conference recommended the amendments that are now part of § 50e, see 1976 REPoRr, supra note 207, at 286-307, it had considered a study proposing amend-

ments to section 50-e. See Graziano, Recommendations Relating to Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law and Related Statutes, TwENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENCE
358 (1976). Rather than amending subdivision (5) of § 50-e by redefining the time within
which a claimant could seek leave to serve a late notice of claim as the period of the statute
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Indeed, in Beary, the Court of Appeals implicitly acknowledged
that under the 1976 amendment, the time within which a late notice
of claim may be served is tolled by a claimant's infancy. The Beary
Court, in evaluating the retroactivity of the 1976 amendment, was
sensitive to the extent to which a disability could extend the time
for leave to serve a late notice. 229 Thus, the Court concluded that
retroactive application of the 1976 amendment had to be limited to
claims arising within 1 year of the amendment's effective date to
23
avoid resurrecting claims that had accrued as long as 18 years ago. 1
If the Beary Court had not assumed that the tolling provision applied, it need not have concerned itself with stale claims.
of limitations, Professor Graziano proposed to modify § 50-e(1) by adding a new subdivision
(b). The suggested subdivision would have extended the time within which a notice of claim
may be served by the length of the disability. Graziano, supra, at 385-86. Insertion of Professor Graziano's proposal under subdivision 1, rather than subdivision 5, would have had the
effect of according an infant an absolute right to serve a notice of claim within 90 days of the
date he reaches his majority. If that time expired, application could have been made for leave
to serve a late notice in accordance with proposed amended subdivision (5). Graziano, supra,
at 387, 402.
A different result obtains under the amendment that was actually enacted. The amended
language is part of subdivision (5), entitled: "Application for leave to serve late notice." As
enacted, the infant does not have an absolute right to serve a notice of claim within 90 days
after he reaches his majority, but must seek leave to do so. Thus, the recommendation
adopted by the legislature differs from the Graziano proposal, wlyich would have conferred
an absolute right to serve a late notice of claim, in that permission to serve a late notice must
be sought from a court.
22' See Beary, 44 N.Y.2d 398, 408, 413, 377 N.E.2d 453, 455, 458-59, 406 N.Y.S.2d 9, 11,
14 (1978).
Id. at 413, 377 N.E.2d at 458-59, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 14 (1978). In discussing the 1976
amendment, the Beaty Court observed:
The outside time limit for a claimant who seeks to file belatedly was formerly
"one year after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based." Under
the revision, the period during which late filing may be permitted is identical with
"the time limited for the commencement of an action against the public corporation." Save where the claimant is under a disability . . . this is one year and 90
days.
Id. at 408, 377 N.E.2d at 455, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 11 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
Relying on Beaty, the first department in Vega v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 65
App. Div. 2d 713, 714, 410 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (1st Dep't 1978), denied an infant leave to serve
a late notice of claim for an injury occurring in 1963.
Indeed, in a prior case, the second department appeared to recognize that under the 1976
amendment to § 50-e, the period of time within which an infant may apply for leave to serve
a late notice is tolled by infancy. In McGill v. Board of Educ., 59 App. Div. 2d 888, 399
N.Y.S.2d 41 (2d Dep't 1977), appeal dismissed, 43 N.Y.2d 893, 374 N.E.2d 396, 403 N.Y.S.2d
499 (1978), a pre-Beaty case, the court refused to apply the 1976 amendment retroactively,
but noted that such an application would be of no assistance to the claimant, who did not
move for leave to serve a late notice within 1 year and 90 days of the time she reached her
majority. Id. at 888-89, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 42. Thus, the second department itself implicitly
assumed that the time period for serving a late notice of claim is tolled by infancy.
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Finally, the Cohen court's restrictive interpretation of section
50-e seems to deprive the 1976 amendment of its vitality by giving
it de minimus effect. Where an infant brings an action against a
municipal corporation, the amendment, as interpreted in Cohen,
merely substitutes 1 year and 90 days for the prior 1-year period as
the time limitation within which an infant may apply for permission
to serve a late notice of claim. This result hardly supplied the
"urgently require [d] statutory relief' to which the Judicial Conference referred in its 1976 report to the legislature. 3 ' Further, in actions against public corporations where the applicable statute of
limitations is 1 year,231 the Cohen interpretation has the effect of
negating the amendment and reinstating the prior law, since under
either version of section 50-e the time limitation to apply for leave
to serve a late notice would be 1 year from the date the cause of
action accrues. Because such results were not intended by the legislative changes, other courts should not follow this rigid position.
Clara S. Licata

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW

GOL § 17-103(1): Contractualprovision agreed upon before cause
of action accrued may not extend statute of limitations notwithstanding contrary intent of parties
Statutes of limitations are intended to protect individuals from
"stale" and "vexatious" claims and the public by "giving repose to
human affairs." Although
contracting parties have some freedom
0
1976 REPORT, supra note 207, at 286.
public corporation includes a municipal corporation, a district corporation or a
public benefit corporation. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 66(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). The
1-year 90-day statute of limitations prescribed by § 50-i of the General Municipal Law applies
only to municipal corporations. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-i (McKinney 1977). There are numerous
public benefit corporations within the Public Authorities Law which prescribe a 1-year statute of limitations for tort claims. E.g., N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 569-a(2), 1276(2), 1297(2),
1299-p(2) (McKinney 1970).
1 Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1969); see Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938).
Although considered statutes of repose, Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270
N.Y. 287, 302, 200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936), statutes of limitations often may prevent the assertion of a just claim. Any resulting hardship, however, is deemed outweighed by the public
interest in barring stale claims. Id. at 302, 200 N.E. at 827-28; Note, Validity and Effect of
Agreements Waiving the Statute of Limitations, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 718, 718. Moreover, courts
may not ignore these statutes in order to prevent an unjust result. In re City of New York
(Elm St.), 239 N.Y. 220, 225; 146 N.E. 342, 344 (1924); see CPLR 201 (1972). See generally 1
WK&M
201.01.
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